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1 Introduction
In 2013 Zimbabwe enacted a new Constitution. The new
Zimbabwean Constitution has a strong bias towards the protection
and promotion of human rights. Chapter 4 of the Constitution is
entitled ‘Declaration of Rights’ and enshrines the rights of
Zimbabwean citizens and residents. The article discusses the
constitutional advances brought about by the finding in Mudzuru &
Another v the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs & 2
Others.1 Three areas where the judgment arguably makes a significant
jurisprudential contribution are highlighted, namely, (i) with respect
to the issue of standing to bring a constitutional challenge under the
Constitution of Zimbabwe; (ii) with respect to the use of international
treaty law and foreign case law; and (iii) its purposive approach to the
interpretation of the relevant constitutional provisions relating to child
marriage. 
The case revolved around a constitutional challenge to the
Marriage Act2 and to the Customary Marriages Act.3 The former, in
section 22(1), prohibited the marriage of a boy under the age of 18
and a girl under the age of 16 years, except with the written
permission of the Minister of Justice if he or she considered such a
marriage desirable. This entailed permitting child marriages and
establishing a different marriage age for boys and girls. The
Customary Marriages Act sets no minimum age for a customary
marriage, thus, according to received wisdom, that the minimum age
for marriage is the attainment of puberty. A constitutional challenge
was brought by two Zimbabwean women who had been in a union
since an early age. They sought to have child marriage under both
civil and customary law declared in violation of various sections of the
Zimbabwean Constitution. Based on an analysis of the consequences
of child marriage, and relying on treaty law and foreign case law in its
interpretation of the applicable constitutional sections, the
Constitutional Court found that from the date of the judgment, no
marriage of a person below the age of 18 years would be legal. The
ruling applies equally to girls and boys. 
2 Locus standi to pursue a constitutional case
The Mudzuru matter is an example of litigation instituted in the public
interest. Public interest is defined as4 
something in which the public, the community at large, has some




4 Black’s law dictionary (1994).
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are affected. It does not mean anything as narrow as mere curiosity, or as
the interest of the particular localities, which may be affected by the
matters in question. Interest shared by citizens generally in affairs of local,
state or national government … 
A 2009 paper5 describes public interest litigation as ‘an expression for
the sufferers of silence’ as well as ‘a blessing to the downtrodden,
oppressed sections of society’. Acting in the public interest requires
that the applicant in the case has adequate locus standi. Locus standi
refers to standing or the right to approach a court directly to seek
appropriate relief in cases arising from an alleged infringement of a
fundamental human right or freedom enshrined in Chapter 4 of the
Constitution. How public interest litigation widens the interpretation
of the locus standi principle is discussed later in this section. Persons
specified under section 85(1) of the Constitution have the right to
approach a court directly. Section 85(1) provides:6 
(1) Any of the following persons, namely –
(a) any person acting in their own interests;
(b) any person acting on behalf of another person who cannot act
for themselves;
(c) any person acting as a member, or in the interests, of a group or
class of persons;
(d) any person acting in the public interest;
(e) any association acting in the interests of its members;
is entitled to approach a court, alleging that a fundamental right or
freedom enshrined in this chapter has been, is being or is likely to be
infringed and the court may grant appropriate relief, including a
declaration of rights and an award of compensation.’
The Mudzuru judgment sets out the applicant’s cause of action based
on a claim7 
that the fundamental rights of a girl child to equal treatment before the
law and not to be subjected to any form of marriage as enshrined in
section 81(1) as read with section 78(1) of the Constitution have been, are
being and are likely to be infringed if an order declaring section 22(1) of
the Marriage Act and any other law authorising child marriage
unconstitutional was not granted by the Court. 
The first locus standi issue the bench had to decide was in which
capacity the applicants acted in claiming the right to approach the
court in relation to the allegations they had made.8 In claiming locus
standi under section 85(1) of the Constitution, a person should act in
a single capacity when approaching a court, and not in two or more
capacities in one proceeding, as the applicants in this matter had
5 IK Walia ‘Public interest litigation: An expression of voice for the sufferers of
silence’ 20 November 2009) http://ssrn.com/abstract=1510271 (accessed
10 October 2016).
6 This section finds an equivalent in sec 38 of the South African Constitution.
7 Mudzuru (n 1 above) 9.
8 As above.
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attempted to do when they based their application on both sections
85(1)(a) and 85(1)(d).9 
The respondents (the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary
Affairs) correctly submitted that, although the applicants claimed to
have been acting in their own interests in terms of section 85(1)(a) of
the Constitution, the facts showed that they had failed to satisfy the
requirements of that provision. According to the respondents, the rule
requires that a person claiming the right to approach the court using
section 85(1)(a) must show on the facts that he or she is the victim, or
there must be harm or injury to his or her own interests, arising
directly from an infringement of the fundamental right or freedom of
another person. In other words, the respondents sought a narrow
interpretation of locus standi, an interpretation which required that
the applicant must have a direct relationship with the cause of action. 
Both applicants in the Mudzuru matter fell pregnant before the age
of 18. Having fallen pregnant, they proceeded to live with the families
of their respective partners, but neither of their pregnancies led to any
of the applicants entering into a formal or customary marriage. In
other words, neither of the two applicants was a victim of child
marriage (strictly construed), which was the reason why they could
not prove a direct relationship to the cause of action. Moreover, when
they approached the court, they were no longer under 18 years of
age and, therefore, were no longer children (as constitutionally
defined in section 81(1)). The applicants thus failed to meet the
standard of locus standi based on the requirement of proof by the
claimant that he or she had been or was a victim of infringement, or
threatened infringement, of a fundamental right or freedom
enshrined in Chapter 4 of the Constitution. The applicants’ papers
further did not refer to any particular girl or girls whose rights had
been, were being, or were likely to be infringed by being subjected to
child marriage, whether such marriage was concluded in terms of
section 22(1) of the Marriage Act or any other law.
In legal matters heard under the previous Zimbabwean
Constitution, standing usually was interpreted in the traditional
narrow manner, and no one could ordinarily seek judicial redress for
legal injury suffered by another person, the only exception being
when a person was unable to seek relief because they were in
detention. However, the Zimbabwean Constitution liberalised and
gave the locus standi principle a much more generous interpretation.
This means that a court exercising jurisdiction under section 85(1) of
the Constitution could adopt a broad and generous approach to
standing. In the Mudzuru matter, the bench chose a wider
interpretation of locus standi. This wide interpretation followed
Canadian case law,10 which effectively states that an applicant may
9 As above.
10 The bench quoted the cases of R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd (1985) 18 DLR (4th) 321
and Morgentaler Smoling & Scott v R (1988) 31 CRR 1.
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act even in instances where he or she has only an indirect interest in
the outcome of the matter. This interpretation was a step forward in
implementing the current constitutional provisions related to
standing. A wider interpretation means that the standing rule no
longer serves as an overly-restrictive tool used for ‘narrowing the road
to litigation’.11 Instead, the locus standi principle, when widely
interpreted, gives anyone with a sufficient direct and indirect interest
in a matter the right to be heard before an appropriate court of law. 
While it was held that the applicants had failed to meet the
requirements for establishing locus standi based on section 85(1)(a),
the Court held that the applicants could nevertheless act in terms of
section 85(1)(d) of the Constitution. The respondents’ argument that
the applicants were not entitled to approach the Court to vindicate
public interest in the well-being of children protected by the
fundamental rights of the child, enshrined in section 81(1) of the
Constitution, overlooked the fact that children are a vulnerable group
in society whose welfare constitutes a category of public interest.
Actions brought in terms of section 85(1)(d) of the Constitution seek
to protect the public interest adversely affected by the infringement of
a fundamental right. According to the Court:12 
The right to a remedy provided for under section 85(1) of the Constitution
is one of the most fundamental and essential rights for the effective
protection of all other fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in
Chapter 4. 
Hence, in the event of a proven infringement of a fundamental right,
the right to a remedy provided for by section 85(1) of the
Constitution becomes an effective tool for the protection of
fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in Chapter 4. Section
85(1) of the Constitution in its current form ensures that formal
defects in the legal system are overcome, thereby guaranteeing13 
real and substantial justice to every person, including the poor,
marginalised, and deprived sections of society. The fundamental principle
behind section 85(1) of the Constitution is that every fundamental human
right enshrined in Chapter 4 is entitled to effective protection under the
constitutional obligation imposed on the state. The right of access to
justice, which is itself a fundamental right, must be availed to a person who
is able, under each of the rules of standing, to vindicate the interest
adversely affected by an infringement of a fundamental right, at the same
time enforcing the constitutional obligation to protect and promote the
right or freedom concerned.
According to the Court, the section 85(1)(d) procedure should,
however, never be used ‘to protect private, personal or parochial
interests since, by definition, public interest is not private, personal or
11 GN Okeke ‘Re-examining the role of locus standi in the Nigerian legal
jurisprudence’ (2013) 6 Journal of Politics and Law 210.
12 Mudzuru (n 1 above) 13.
13 Mudzuru 14, referring also with approval to Ferreira v Levin NO & Others 1996 (1)
SA 984 (CC).
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parochial interest’.14 This requirement is necessary to guard against
frivolous and mala fide applications brought before the courts, not in
an attempt to seek justice, but to waste time or actually impede the
carrying out of justice. It is imperative, therefore, for the applicants’
cause of action to show that the proceedings are in the public
interest. However, it does not need to be shown that a significant
section of the community is affected.15 Public interest is a value-laden
concept which is not defined in section 85(1)(d) of the Constitution.
The courts have preferred to leave the definition of public interest
open, instead preferring to determine the question of public interest
on a case-by-case basis. Since most violations of fundamental human
rights and freedoms are fact and context-specific, it is appropriate to
keep concepts such as ‘public interest’ broad and flexible to develop
in line with changing times and social conditions reflective of
community attitudes. The concept is elastic and relative rather than
fixed and absolute. Whether a person is acting in the public interest is
a question of fact.16
This approach to section 85(1)(d) of the Constitution does not
mean that public interest is ‘that which gratifies curiosity or merely
satisfies appetite for information or amusement’.17 There is a
difference between ‘what is in the public interest’ and what is of
interest to the public. Matters of public interest that affect
fundamental rights and freedoms include, for example, public health;
national security; defence; international obligations; proper and due
administration of criminal justice; independence of the judiciary;
observance of the rule of law; the welfare of children; and a clean
environment, among others.18 On the other hand, matters that are of
interest to the public are often matters that arouse the public’s
curiosity, for example, a scandal involving a person widely known in
that society. Whereas matters in the public interest involve the
protection and promotion of fundamental rights of a section of
society, matters of interest to the public do not revolve around the
protection or promotion of any rights.
According to the Court, the paramount test in public interest cases
should be whether the alleged infringement of a fundamental right or
freedom has the effect of prejudicially affecting or potentially affecting
the community at large or a segment of the community. The test
covers cases of marginalised or underprivileged persons in society
who, because of reasons such as poverty, disability, socially or
economically disadvantaged positions, are unable to approach a court
to vindicate their rights. A public interest action will usually involve
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goals of social justice.19 Children fall squarely in this category of
potential beneficiaries.
The broad interpretation given to locus standi in Madzuru bodes
particularly well for future actions brought to further the interests of
vulnerable groups based on alleged constitutional infringements.
These could include advancing women’s rights, children’s rights, the
rights of the elderly, persons with disabilities and veterans of the
liberation struggle, all of whom have dedicated provisions attaching
to them in Part 3 of Chapter 4 of the Constitution. Other vulnerable
groups, such as migrants, cannot be left out of the equation either.
This has also introduced certainty in the role played by public interest
litigation in relation to breathing life into the provisions of the
Zimbabwean Constitution, in that anyone with a direct or indirect
interest can move to have constitutional rights protected and upheld.
3 Reliance on international treaty law and foreign law
3.1 Treaties
In the three years following the enactment of the Constitution, the
courts have already relied on international law and treaties to deal
with alleged violations of a Chapter 4 right. For example, in the case
of S v C (A minor),20 the Court relied on international law and treaties,
excerpts of which are quoted at length in the judgment, to test the
constitutionality of a sentence of corporal punishment imposed upon
a juvenile offender. In this case, corporal punishment was found to be
a violation of the international law principles protecting children’s
rights, such that the court held that corporal punishment was an
unconstitutional method of punishing juvenile offenders. This led the
court to strike down the offending provision of the Criminal Procedure
and Evidence Act.21 (In an obiter dictum, the Court also held that the
constitutional prohibition against corporal punishment extended to
that imposed by parents or those acting in loco parentis.) In the recent
case of Makoni v Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs,22 a
sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of judicial review
or parole was ruled to be unconstitutional. The Court cited, inter alia,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
General Comment 21 of the United National Human Rights
Committee, and Resolution 70/175 of the UN General Assembly,
titled United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules), in support of its finding. 
Deputy Chief Justice Malaba’s judgment in Mudzuru also presents a
commendable example of how the courts can make effective use of
19 Mudzuru 18. 
20 2015 ZWHHC 718.
21 Cap 9:07.
22 CCZ 46/15 (judgment of 13 September 2016).
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international law and treaties in their reasoning. The applicants had in
fact relied on the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)23
and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
(African Children’s Charter)24 in support of the argument that
allowing children under the age of 18 years to be married entails
subjecting them to maltreatment, neglect and abuse which is
proscribed in section 81(1)(e) of the Constitution.25 The argument is
bolstered by constitutional provisions requiring courts to take
international law, treaties and conventions into account when
interpreting constitutional rights,26 by the provision enjoining courts
to interpret legislation in a manner consistent with international
customary law,27 and the provision requiring the adoption of an
interpretation consistent with any treaty or convention that is binding
on Zimbabwe.28
In Madzuru the Constitutional Court held that, by ratifying the CRC
and the African Children’s Charter, ‘Zimbabwe expressed its
commitment to take all appropriate measures, including legislative, to
protect and enforce the rights of the child as enshrined in the relevant
conventions to ensure that they are enjoyed in practice’.29 A reading
of section 78(1) of the Constitution, dealing with marriage rights,30
and of section 81 (dealing with children’s rights) indicates that these
sections were formulated with international treaties in mind, as aptly
noted in the Mudzuru case.31 This gave rise to the inference that these
constitutional provisions must, therefore, be read progressively. The
constitutionalisation of the applicable international human rights
norms, and the influence they consequently exerted on the reasoning
of the Court in this case, indicate that these treaty rights may be
directly applicable in domestic jurisprudence. This point has previously
23 Ratified by Zimbabwe in 1990.
24 Ratified by Zimbabwe in 1995.
25 Sec 81(1) provides: ‘(1) Every child, that is to say every boy and girl under the age
of eighteen years, has the right - (a) to equal treatment before the law, including
the right to be heard; .... (d) to family or parental care or to appropriate care
when removed from the family environment; (e) to be protected from economic
and sexual exploitation, from child labour, and from maltreatment, neglect or any
form of abuse; (f) to education, health care services, nutrition and shelter. (2) A
child’s best interests are paramount in every matter concerning the child. (3)
Children are entitled to adequate protection by the courts, in particular by the




29 Mudzuru (n 1 above) 27.
30 Titled ‘Marriage Rights’, sec 78(1) provides: ‘(1) Every person who has attained
the age of eighteen years has the right to found a family. (2) No person may be
compelled to enter into marriage against their will.’
31 Mudzuru (n 1 above) 42.
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been made with regard to the jurisprudence of the South African
Constitutional Court in the sphere of children’s rights.32 
In this regard, the Court held that the meaning of section 78(1)
could not be ascertained without having regard to the context of the
obligations undertaken by Zimbabwe under international conventions
and treaties on matters of marriage and family relations at the time of
the enactment of the Constitution in May 2013. ‘Regard must also be
had to the emerging consensus of values in the international
community of which Zimbabwe is a part on how children should be
treated.’33 Noting that most earlier conventions do not provide a
minimum age for marriage (cited were the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Marriage
Convention of 1962,34 which do not specify a minimum age for
marriage,35 and the CRC),36 the Court narrowed its focus to article 21
of the African Children’s Charter, which article was quoted in full in
the judgment.37 In ‘clear and unambiguous language’, article 21
imposes on state parties, including Zimbabwe, an obligation which
they voluntarily undertook ‘to take all appropriate measures to
eliminate harmful social and cultural practices affecting the welfare,
dignity, normal growth and development of the child’.38 According to
the Court, these positive measures entail that state parties are obliged
to abolish child marriage.
Not mincing its words, the Court found that article 21 of the
African Children’s Charter had a ‘direct effect’ on the validity of the
impugned sections of the Marriage Act.39 Hence, the contention by
the respondent Minister that the provisions of section 78 dealing with
marriage rights should be read literally to mean that a person of 18
years or older has the right to found a family (but that it does not in
express terms impact on their right to marry when younger than this
age, as provided for in the Marriage Act) was rejected. The Court
stated that it would lead to an absurd position, namely, that a family
is not founded on marriage and, conversely, that a person under the
age of 18 years would have the right to marry but not to found a
32 J Sloth-Nielsen & H Kruuse ‘A maturing manifesto: The constitutionalisaton of
children’s rights in South African jurisprudence 2007-2012?’ (2013) International
Journal on Children’s Rights 646-678. Also see A Skelton ‘South Africa’ in J Doek &
T Liefaard Litigating the rights of the child (2015) 15.
33 Mudzuru (n 1 above) 26-27.
34 Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age and Registration of Marriages.
35 The Recommendation which accompanied the Marriage Convention directed
state parties to specify a minimum age of not less than 15 years.
36 See the definition of ‘child’ in art 1, that is, every human being below the age of
18 years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.
Marriage, of course, is one way in which majority would be obtained earlier. As
the judge notes, the CRC does not contain a specific provision on child marriage.
37 Mudzuru (n 1 above) 36.
38 Mudzuru 37.
39 As above.
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family.40 A literal interpretation of section 78(1) would, in addition,
not give the fundamental right guaranteed the full measure of
protection that it deserves. The nature and scope of the right to found
a family (not always, but in many instances) require an agreement to
live together as husband and wife, which union forms the foundation
and nucleus of the family.41 Furthermore, the Court held that, read in
the context of section 78(2),42 which enshrines the guarantee that
persons who have attained the age of 18 years must give free consent
to marriage without compulsion, section 78(1) clearly entails
restricting marriage to those of 18 years and above. This leads to the
conclusion that those below the age of 18 years have no legal
capacity to marry.
The use by the Court of international human rights law, and in
particular the African Children’s Charter, is to be welcomed.43 The
judgment sets an important standard for the other 47 state parties to
the Charter,44 insofar as it delineates the expectation for domestic
statutes on marriage and child protection law. Further, it accords
primacy to treaty obligations which were voluntarily undertaken. 
3.2 Foreign law
The Constitutional Court judgment is also commendable for the wide
variety of foreign cases cited in support of various assertions and
conclusions. Deputy Chief Justice Malaba drew on jurisprudence from
Canada, South Africa, Australia, various cases from the United
Kingdom, and from India. Although none of the foreign cases cited
directly involved child marriage, it is to be welcomed that the
Zimbabwean Constitutional Court is willing to seek support in foreign
law for advancing principles of constitutional interpretation which
resonate with international best practices.45
40 Mudzuru 43. See also dicta to this effect at 45 and 46.
41 Mudzuru 44. The Court subsequently does not privilege this view of the nuclear
family to the exclusion of other family forms, but acknowledges that the right to
found a family may be exercised by a single person who lives with or brings up his
or her children (46). Further, at 45, the Court notes that the Constitution does not
specify the type or nature of marriage contemplated and, therefore, that a person
can choose to enter into any kind of marriage and found a family according to
sec 78(1).
42 Sec 78(3) contains a prohibition on persons of the same sex entering into
marriage.
43 For an earlier discussion of the use of the African Children’s Charter and the CRC
in jurisprudence, see A Skelton ‘The development of a fledgling child rights
jurisprudence in Eastern and Southern Africa based on international and regional
instruments’ (2009) 9 African Human Rights Law Journal 482. See further Skelton
(n 32 above).
44 At the time of writing.
45 Extensive reliance on foreign law is evident in the recent Makoni decision (n 22
above).
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4 Purposive reading of section 78(1)
In considering the purposive reading accorded section 78(1) by the
Court, regard must be had to the defence adduced by the
respondents in support of the interpretation of the constitutional
validity of the provisions of the Marriage Act, and the Customary
Marriages Act (insofar as the latter does not establish a minimum age
for marriage).
One leg of the defence has already been referred to in section 2 of
the article, namely, that the applicants lacked standing to bring an
application for constitutional validity as they were parties to
unregistered unions covered by neither the Marriage Act nor the
Customary Marriages Act. Moreover, they were no longer children as
constitutionally defined. The Court, however, found that they did
have standing in the public interest.
A second objection argued by the respondents was alluded to in
section 3.1, namely, that section 78(1) read literally only established
the right to ‘found a family’ from the age of 18, and that this did not
mean that persons below this age could not marry. The absurdity of
this interpretation was correctly identified by the Court.46 
The third objection raised by the respondents was that a
discriminatory age for marriage of girls and boys was justified on the
ground that, physiologically and psychologically, a girl matures earlier
than a boy. This averment, the Court held, was without scientific
evidence to support it, and was countered by the international law
position which is to the effect that the minimum age for marriage is
set at 18 precisely because only persons above this age are considered
psychologically and physiologically developed enough to be capable
of giving free and full consent to marriage, and to bear children.47
The Court’s reasoning displayed commendable concern for gender
equality, dispelling patriarchal views that ‘females were destined solely
for the home and the rearing of children of the family and that only
males were destined for the market place and the world of ideas’.48 
A fourth strand of reasoning cited by the respondents was the fear
that if the marriage laws allowing child marriage were struck down as
unconstitutional, ‘men would impregnate girls and not bear the
responsibility of having to marry them’.49 In its response, the Court
reiterated the constitutional guarantee of equality of boys and girls
without exception, and noted that the circumstance of a girl falling
pregnant did not ‘disentitle her from the enjoyment of all the rights of
a child enshrined in section 81(1) of the Constitution’. Pregnancy did
not make her an adult.50 Whilst pregnant, she is also entitled to all
46 Mudzuru (n 1 above) 43. Also see dicta to this effect at 45 and 46.




MUDZURU v MINISTER OF JUSTICE                                                                                  565
other rights awarded children, such as the right to parental care, and
the right to schooling.51 In the view of the Court, the parental
obligation to care for and control the girl child does not cease
because of her pregnancy. The Court conceded that early pregnancy
was a social problem that stakeholders should co-operate to solve, but
that compelling a pregnant girl to marry constitutes a form of abuse,
and cannot justify child marriage.52
The Court further held, after providing convincing and detailed
evidence of the harmful consequences of child marriage for a child’s
education, economic opportunities in life, and sexual and
reproductive health, that a law which purported to authorise child
marriage as legitimate could not be said to be in the best interests of
the child53 and, hence, that the various aspects of the constitutional
clause on children’s rights supported a position which recognised the
horrific consequences of early marriage for girl children, and justified
striking down the Marriage Act as unconstitutional. The Court
ultimately declared that section 78(1) of the Constitution set 18 as the
minimum age for marriage in Zimbabwe and that, with effect from
the date of judgment (20 January 2016), no person, male or female,
may enter into any form of marriage54 before attaining the age of
18 years.
In adopting a purposive interpretation of section 78(1), the Court
was mindful of the social milieu in which such an endeavour had to
occur, by stating:55
The history of the struggle against child marriage sadly shows that there
has been, for a long time, lack of common social consciousness on the
problems of girls who became victims of early marriages. 
The stark reality is that Zimbabwe is regarded as a child marriage
‘hotspot’. With a child population estimated at 47 per cent, 4 per cent
of girls are married before the age of 15, and 31 per cent are married
before the age of 18. Zimbabwe is ranked at 41 on the list of
countries where children marry before the age of 18 years.56 The rate
of child marriage is higher in some areas than in others. An analysis of
the 2012 National Housing and Population Census by the Zimbabwe
Statistics Agency illustrates that the majority of child marriages occur
in rural areas, in districts such as Chiredzi, Kariba Rural, Makonde,
51 Education Circular 35 of 2001 grants leave to girls who fall pregnant in primary
and secondary schools and allows their re-enrolment after delivery.
52 Mudzuru (n 1 above) 54.
53 Mudzuru 51.
54 Unregistered customary law unions and unions arising out of religion or religious
rites are expressly covered by the ruling.
55 Mudzuru (n 1 above) 53.
56 http://www.devinfo.info/mdg5b/profiles/files/profiles/4/Child_Marriage_Country_
Profile_AFRZWE_Zimbabwe.pdf (accessed 5 January 2014).
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Mbire, Muzarabani, Sanyati and Shamva, with a proportion of above
35 per cent.57 On average, one out of three girls will be married
before their eighteenth birthday.58
Furthermore, there have been reports of acceptance of the
phenomenon in influential circles. In June 2015, the Attorney-General
of Zimbabwe was widely reported as saying that young girls who are
not in school and who are doing nothing should be able to be
married off by their parents.59 Further, he is reported to have claimed
that it was not practical to jail adults who have sex with ‘consenting’
12 year-old girls because the girls would suffer more with no one to
look after them while their abusers are being incarcerated.60 These
comments were very widely reported and attracted a barrage of
criticism, as Zimbabweans took to various forms of social media to
protest and to call for his resignation from office. The Constitutional
Court could not have been unaware of this, given the extensive media
coverage that it attracted, and given the fact that the Mudzuru matter
had already been argued before it in December of the preceding year.
It is thus possible that the Constitutional Court was aware of the need
to send out a strong message against child marriage to counter these
conservative and, it should be stated, rather irresponsible remarks
from a public leader. 
The transformative nature of the Constitution in altering the social
reality appears to have been fully appreciated by the Court. The Court
highlights that once it becomes known that child marriage in
Zimbabwe is abolished, ‘the imperative character of the law shall be
felt in the hearts and minds of men and women so strongly that
transformative obedience to it shall become a matter of habit’.61
5 Regional impact
Subsequent to this ruling, a legal challenge to the Tanzania Law of
Marriage Act was brought, which allowed girls to marry at the age of
15 with parental permission, and at the age of 14 with the permission
of a court.62 The High Court ruled this provision unconstitutional on
57 http://www.zimstat.co.zw/sites/default/files/img/National_Report.pdf (accessed
5 October 2016).
58 Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTAT) Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
2014, Key Findings. Harare, Zimbabwe. This survey is cited in the Mudzuru
judgment. See further Plan International In-depth review of legal and regulatory
frameworks on child marriages in Zimbabwe (2016). See further http://
www.girlsnotbrides.com (accessed 5 October 2016).
59 http://www.chronicle.co.zw/let-them-have-sex-marry-tomana-says-12-year-olds-
can-consent/ (accessed 10 October 2016).
60 As above.
61 Mudzuru (n 1 above) 54.
62 Rebeca Gyumi v Attorney-General Misc Civil Cause 5 2016 (copy on file with
authors).
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the basis that it contravened the equality clause63 of the Constitution
of Tanzania, 1977 (as amended). Apart from the difference in the
minimum age for marriage of girls and boys, a further ground for
alleging discrimination was that the Act provided differently for girls
who had parents or guardians in a position to furnish consent, and
those who did not (in this instance parental consent could be waived). 
However, the government of Tanzania (in the words of the High
Court) ‘strongly resisted’ the claim of unconstitutionality’ in that
Court. The basis for the respondent’s opposition was the sentiments
of the people in divergent communities based on custom, tradition
and religious belief in relation to marriage. Arguing that the 1971
Marriage Act of Tanzania was a compromise to accommodate this
diversity, it was further suggested that the provision requiring the
intervention by a court for the marriage of a person below the age of
majority provided a safety valve.64 Noting that the law itself seemed
to have reservations about the capacity of girls aged 15 years and over
to make an informed decision to marry (by also requiring parental
consent), and significantly swayed by the in-depth arguments in
Madzuru about the negative consequences of child marriage for girls,
the Court agreed with the petitioner that the Marriage Act of
Tanzania was unconstitutional. As was the case with the Madzuru
judgment, significant weight is accorded the provisions of the African
Children’s Charter, notably article 21, and the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (African
Women’s Protocol) (which also establishes the minimum age for
marriage at 18).65 
The government of Tanzania, however, has now noted an appeal
against the judgment,66 which is clearly indicative of ongoing strong
resistance to the proposition that the marriage of children under 18
should as a matter of principle be outlawed.
At the time of writing, the conclusion of the Tanzanian appeal was
still being awaited. However, it is hoped that the Appeal Court will
follow the lead of the Zimbabwean Constitutional Court by rejecting
arguments defending child marriage on the basis of custom, culture
and belief,67 in clear contravention of regional human rights
commitments. 
63 Since male persons were entitled to marry only from the age of 18 years.
64 Gyumi (n 62 above) 10. It was also argued that boys could approach a court for
leave to marry if they were below 18 but above 14 years of age.
65 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of
Women in Africa (2005) (African Women’s Protocol), ratified by Zimbabwe in
2008.
66 Legalbrief 10 August 2016 (accessed 10 August 2016).
67 Mutangi refers to the fact that Pentecostal churches in Zimbabwe support the
practice of child marriage on religious grounds; T Mutangi ‘Religion, law and
human rights in Zimbabwe’ (2008) 8 African Human Rights Law Journal 526. 
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6 Conclusion
It has been argued that the Madzuru judgment discussed here is
significant for more reasons than may at first glance appear. By
striking down the offending provisions of the Marriage Act, and
including customary marriages and unregistered unions within the
reach of the pronouncement on constitutional invalidity, a strong
signal is sent out that new marriage laws have to be devised. The
international human rights community has for some time been urging
Zimbabwe to undertake this.68 The Constitutional Court has taken a
bold step by addressing the seeming reluctance of the government to
develop and enact such revised laws. Recent research which analysed
the correlation between marriage laws that consistently set the age for
marriage for girls at 18 years or older, and the prevalence of child
marriage and teenage childbearing in 12 sub-Saharan African
countries, revealed that the prevalence of child marriage was 40 per
cent lower in countries with consistent laws against child marriage in
comparison with countries without consistent laws against this
practice, and that the prevalence of teenage childbearing was 25 per
cent lower in countries with laws setting a consistent minimum age
for marriage compared to countries without such laws.69 These results
support the hypothesis that laws containing a consistent minimum
age for marriage protect against the exploitation of girls, and provide
concrete evidence in support of the unequivocal stance taken by the
Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe, 
Further, the Court’s willingness to engage with widely-held social
perceptions regarding girls’ sexual maturity and the appropriate
protection of pregnant girls is important in the context of apparent
support at high level for legal provisions enabling child marriage. 
However, an equally important aspect of the decision lies in the
generous approach to locus standi adopted by the Court, which
signals that in future the Constitution can become a valuable tool in
the hands of civil society seeking to enforce human rights.
Furthermore, the Court’s reliance on international treaty law to
underpin the interpretation of the Constitution and its recourse to
foreign judgments in support of its reasoning are welcomed, as it
lends stature and weight to the Court’s reasoning and avoids the
insularity that characterises some jurisdictions.
68 See, eg, the Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the
Child to Zimbabwe in 2016 (CRC/C/ZWE/CO2 para 46(a)). As early as 1998, in its
Concluding Comments addressed to Zimbabwe, the Human Rights Committee
recommended that the government of Zimbabwe adopt measures to prevent and
eliminate prevailing social and cultural attitudes supporting early and child
marriage, and to address law reform in this regard (CCPR/C/79/Add.89).
69 B Maswikwa et al ‘Minimum marriage age laws and the prevalence of child
marriage and adolescent birth: Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa’ (2015) 41
International Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health 58. 
